Seminar on Human Rights and Welfarism.
The seminar will be a hybrid meeting. It will be held in room 110 on Bracka 12, Kraków, and Teams on October 17, 2023 (Monday, 17:30-19:00 GMT+2).
doc. JUDr. Martin Hapla, Ph.D.: Human Rights as Utilitarian Project
doc. JUDr. Tomáš Sobek, Ph.D.: Ascriptive Argument and Human Rights
Mgr. et Mgr. Jiří Baroš, Ph.D.: Experts, Specialists and Theorists and the Natural Law Tradition: On Different Levels of Moral Thinking
As a prerequisite for the Seminar, we recommend reading the full papers of our guests. To receive the papers, please write to prof. Adam Dyrda.
Abstract of the project
Using the methods of analytic philosophy, the project seeks to shed new light on the relationship between theories of human rights and theories of welfare. It starts from the hypothesis that many of the disputes about the nature and interpretation of human rights are ultimately disputes about the preferred theory of welfare. This approach provides not only new answers to classic questions, but also a corrective to the standard understanding of the purpose of human rights. In particular, the project will examine whether human rights are really incompatible with utilitarianism, or whether these rights, characterized as inherent and inalienable (Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms), are grounded in the theory of natural law. It will then focus on the philosophical background of the proportionality test and analyze whether it is permissible to aggregate human rights infringements, whether these individual rights do indeed conflict with collective interests and the common good, and must necessarily be balanced against each other.
This research was funded by the Priority Research Area Heritage under the program Excellence Initiative – Research University at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow
In their criticism of consequentialism, some proponents of natural law reproach this normative theory for excessively elevating the status of experts and specialists. According to consequentialism, experts and specialists are more capable to determine what is right than those who have limited understanding of human affairs. It seems that the natural law tradition is deeply critical to the account of two levels of moral thinking proposed by contemporary utilitarians.
However, I believe that the situation is much more complex. First of all, “plain persons” are supposed to only formally will the common good, the basic normative reason in the natural law tradition, since it is a responsibility of authority to will it materially. Given the fact that this is valid mainly in the political context, I show that there are also some moral principles, which are ultimately known only to the wise, not by “plain persons”. Through the analysis of these two aspects, I will differentiate between specific types of reasons within the natural law tradition.